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THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION TO THE
DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
On June 13, 1971, The New York Times began publishing a series
of articles based upon a secret government document that had come
into its possession. The secret document dealt with the decision-
making process involved in the escalation of the Vietnam War. Shortly
thereafter The Washington Post published articles based upon the same
document. In the wake of these articles the federal government de-
manded an injunction against any further publication based on the
secret document by the two newspapers and thereby sought to impose
a prior restraint upon the press for the first time in the nation's history 1
The Government contended that the documents and the information
in the possession of the Times and the Post involved a serious breach
of the security of the United States and that further publication would
cause the nation irreparable harm. 2 As a defense to the injunction, the
newspapers relied upon the first amendment prohibition of prior re-
straints on the press.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Although the Government has never before taken such action in
the courts, the struggle between the free press and the government's
responsibility for national security is an old one. In 1777, General
George Washington complained about press leaks which might be
harmful to the Continental Army 4 During the Civil War General
Burnside seized and suppressed an edition of the Chicago Times, alleging
that the Times was publishing material which was secret and that such
activity was dangerous to the public safety 5 Confederate generals fre-
quently used the Yankee press to discover enemy troop movements, and
President Lincoln felt compelled to issue a sweeping order providing
for the court martial of correspondents whose reports were found to
be of aid to the enemy 6
I. United States v. New York Times, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971); United States v. Wash-
ington Post, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Greider, The Press as Adversary, Washington Post, June 27, 1971, at B1, col. 3.
5. 55 Cor. REc. 2005 (1917) (remarks by Senator Ashurst); J. POLLARD, THE PRt.st-
DENTS AND THE PRESS 377-78 (1947).
6. Greider, supra note 4, at B4, col. 3.
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Similar problems occurred during World War II. President Roose-
velt found it necessary to order an investigation of the Chicago Tribune
and the Washington Times-Herald after both papers had published the
Government's secret war mobilization plans only three days before the
attack on Pearl Harbor.7 In 1942, the Chicago Tribune was accused of
leaking the fact that the United States had broken the Japanese naval
code.'
Recently, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that the United States
had issued a peace feeler to Hanoi prompting other news media to ask
for confirmation of the report. When nothing developed from the pro-
posal, there was criticism that the premature publication might have
harmed secret negotiations. 9
The unprecedented attempt by the Government to impose prior re-
straints on the New York Times and the Washington Post coupled
with the history of conflict between the press and national security
raises serious questions as to the scope of the first amendment free press
guaranty Under what conditions did the doctrine of prior restraint
develop? What did the drafters of the Constitution intend by the first
amendment press clause? Under what circumstances if any may ex-
ceptions be made to the prohibition of prior restraints? Under what
authority may the Government assert a right to impose prior restraints
on the press? What facts must be shown by the Government in order
to justify the imposition of a prior restraint?
EvoLuTIoN OF THE DOCTRINE
In England printing first developed under the sponsorship of the
Crown and was therefore subject to Crown control. The sweeping
scope of the system of prior restraint at that time is illustrated by the
Licensing Act of 1662.10 The law has been summarized in the following
manner:
Not only were seditious and heretical books and pamphlets pro-
hibited, but no person was allowed to print any material unless it
was first entered with the Stationers' Company, a government
monopoly, and duly licensed by the appropriate state or clerical
functionary Further, no book was to be imported without a
7. Id. at Bi, col. 3. See J. TERBE., AN AmEmcAN DYNAsrY 159 (1st ed. 1947).
8. Greider, supra note 4, at B4, col. 4.
9. M. STFiN FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 107-08 (1966).
10. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNTiiv. PROB. 648, 650
(1955).
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license; no person was permitted to sell books without a license;
all printing presses had to be registered with the Stationers' Com-
pany; the number of master printers was limited to twenty, and
these were to be licensed and to furmsh bond; and sweeping
powers to search for suspect printed matter in houses and shops,
except the houses of peers, were granted."
The struggle for the freedom of the press was directed primarily at
the power of the licensor, and it was against this power that writers such
as John Milton directed their attacks.12 When the licensing law ex-
pired in 1695, the House of Commons refused extension and it was never
revived.
The disappearance of the prior restraints imposed by the licensing
system did not completely free the press. The crimnal courts extended
the law of treason and seditious libel so as constantly to harass printers-
and publishers by imposing subsequent punishments.' 4 Nonetheless,
prior restraints were abolished, and by the eighteenth century the right
of the press to be free from the power of the censor assumed the status;
of common law Sir William Blackstone explained the law as follows-
[W]here blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, sedi-
tious, or scandalous libels are punished by the English law
the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means in-
fringed or violated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to
the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freemen [sic] has an un-
doubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public:
to forbid thus is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take
the consequences of his own temerity 15
11. Id.
12. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). See Emerson, supra note 10, at 656-60
for a discussion of some of the arguments against any system of censorship. Emerson
concludes that, "'[tjhe form and dynamics of such systems tend strongly toward over-
control-towards an excess of order and an insufficiency of liberty" Id. at 670.
13. Emerson, supra note 10, at 651; F SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND
1476-1776 260-63 (1952).
14. L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 9-13 (1960); SIEBERT, supra note 13, at 264-75.
Subsequent punishments are those penalties imposed after publication of certain material
as opposed to prior restraints which prevent any publication whatsoever. The latter
is commonly called censorship.
15. 4 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (St. G. Tucker ed. 1953).
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Thus, the common law defintion of freedom of press meant an absence
of censorship in advance of publication. Such was the state of the
common law in 1791 when the first amendment was drafted, adopted
by Congress, and ratified by the states.
THE MEANING OF THE PRESS GUARANTY
It is apparent that the first amendment was designed to prohibit the
,establishment of any system of prior restraints similar to those previously
known iii England.16 It has been generally, if not universally, recog-
nized that the chief purpose of the guaranty was to prevent previou
restraints on publication. 17 The prohibition of prior restraints, however,
was not the sole purpose of the free press guaranty ' James Madison,
the drafter of the first amendment, emphasized that the press should
'not only be free from licensing and censorship, but also from the im-
position of subsequent pumshments. 9
It was not until the passage of the Sedition Act of 179820 that a
national awareness of the central meaning of the first amendment was
-created.21 The manifest purpose of the act was the protection of the
Government from damaging critcism, 22 yet a critical press was one of
the primary objectives of the founding fathers in drafting the first
amendment. Jefferson believed the press had the right to criticize, even
-unjusdy, the conduct of public officials.23 In Madison's words, "[t]he
right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication thereon, is the only effective guardian of every other
Tight." 24 The Continental Congress in its letters emphasized that a free,
16. Emerson, supra note 10, at 652.
17. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado, 205
_U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
18. Z. CHsAx, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 10-23 (1954). See also Times Film
'Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 54 (1963); Grosjean v. American Press Co, 297 U.S.
233, 248 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
19. L. LEVY, supra note 14, at 274-75.
20. Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596-97 (1798). The statute made it a crime, pumshable by
a fine and five years in prison,
if any person shall write, print, utter or publish any false, scandalous
and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States, or either house of the Congress or the President with intent
to defame or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or dis-
repute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of
the good people of the United States.
21. L. LEVY, supra note 14, at 258-60.
22. 55 CONG. REc. 2011 (1917) (remarks by Senator Ashurst).
23. See L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEERsoN 355 (1966).
24. See Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under
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critical press would inure to the benefit of all, reasoning that "oppres-
sive officers are ashamed or intimidated, into more honorable and just
modes of conducting affairs." - The Sedition Act was subsequently
condemned as unconstitutional by Jefferson and Madison, fines levied
against violators were repaid by Congress and Jefferson, when President,
pardoned those who had been convicted. 6
The idea of an antagonistic and adversary press constantly exposing
the activities of government and informing the people was a primary
consideration in the adoption of the free press guaranty, as well as the
prohibition of prior restraints. As Mr. Justice Black has stated:
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so
that the press would remain forever free to censure the Govern-
ment. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people. Only a free and unre-
stricted press can effectively expose deception in government.
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the
duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the
people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
fevers and foreign shot and shell.27
EXCEPTIONS
Except for occasional dicta, the Supreme Court did not invoke the
doctrine of prior restraint until 1931 in the case of Near v. Minnesota.28
Therein, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes reaffirmed the central meaning of
the first amendment press guaranty-
[T]he administration of government has become more complex,
the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied,
crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its
protection by unfaithful officials and the impairment of the funda-
mental security of life and property by criminal alliances and
official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and
courageous press, especially in the great cities. The fact that the
liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the
the Constitutton, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1957), quoting from 6 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 398 (1906).
25. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
26. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274-76 (1964).
27. Umted States v. New York Times, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2143 (1971).
28. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (found Minnesota statute which allowed prior restraint of
publications to be violative of first amendment); Emerson, supra note 10, at 652.
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press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appro-
priate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.2
The Chief Justice further stated, however, that even the principle of
immunity from prior restraints is not absolute, emphasizing that certain
"exceptional cases" 30 might exist wherein the Government would be
justified in imposing prior restraints on the press. These included "actual
obstruction of its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops." 31 Prior to the Gov-
ernment's action against the New York Times and the Washington
Post,32 the Hughes dicta in Near v. Minnesota33 was the sole constitu-
tional authority directly relating to the problem of exceptions to the
doctrine of prior restraint in cases involving conflict between the free
press and national security Yet the examples cited by Hughes fell far
short of providing an effective standard for determining the types of
publications which might be denied immunity from prior restraints.
In United States v New York Times3 4 and United States v. Washing-
ton Post,35 the Government's power to censor information allegedly
endangering the national security was brought directly into focus. The
Government based its power to impose prior restraints on the press
upon the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of
foreign affairs and on the Espionage Act of 1917 31
The Court found, however, that the Espionage Act did not apply
to the press.37 This conclusion was based in part upon a review of the
legislative history of the act, which revealed that in 1917 Congress elim-
inated from the proposed bill a provision that would have given the
President broad powers in time of war to prohibit publication of infor-
mation threatening the national defense.3 8 Congressional objections to
29. 283 U.S. at 719-20.
30. Id. at 715-16. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-49 (1961); Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 483 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (194Z).
31. 283 U.S. at 715-16.
32. United States v. New York Times, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971); United States v. Wash-
mgton Post, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971).
33. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
34. 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971)
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See concurring opinions of Black, J. and Marshall, J.
38. 55 CoNG. REc. 2166 (1917). The provision read:
During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the US. is
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the proposed clause were based on the fear that such a provision would
allow the imposition of prior restraints.3 9 In addition, the Court found
that a 1950 amendment to the Espionage Act requires that the act be
construed so as not to infringe upon the freedom of the press.40 Finally,
the Court found that usual methods of statutory interpretation lead to
the conclusion that the act did not apply to the press.41
Since the President lacks statutory authority to impose prior re-
straints on the press when a publication threatens the national security,
his authority must stem from the inherent powers of his office. It has
long been accepted that responsibility for the conduct of foreign rela-
tions is an area committed to the sole discretion of the executive and
should not be subject to judicial review 42 Every government, by its
very existence, has the power to apply to the courts for assistance in
providing for the security and welfare of its people,43 and it has been
recognized that "[i] t would be intolerable that courts, without the rele-
vant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret." 4
Despite the President's primacy in the area of foreign relations, it is
the Judiciary and not the Executive which has the duty independently
to determine whether the granting of an injunction sought by the Ex-
ecutive would abridge constitutional protections.4  The President is
a party or from threat of such war, the President may, by proclamation,
prohibit the publishing or communication of, or the attempting to publish
or commumcate, any information relating to the national defense, which m
his judgment is of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy
55 CONG. Ra~c. 1763 (1917).
39. See 55 CONG. REc. 2004-11 (1917) (remarks by Senator Ashurst); 55 CoNG. Rc.
2165 (1917) (remarks by Senator Reed); 55 CONG. REc. 2003 (1917) (remarks by Sena-
tor Vardaman)
40. Ch. 1024, § 1, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
41. The pertinent provision merely mentions "communicates" and not "publication,"
whereas other sections of the statute distinguish between publishing and communication.
See concurring opinion of Douglas, J. in United States v. New York Times, 91 S. Cr.
2140, 2145 (1971).
42. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)
43. In Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895)
44. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
Ill (1948)
45. See dissenting opinion of Harlan, J. in United States v. New York Times, 91
S. Ct. 2140, 2160-64 (1971); New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964);
Edwards v South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386
(1962); Pennakamp v Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 950 (1935).
[Vol. 13.214
PRIOR RESTRAINT
obligated to act within the limts of his power, but it is for the Court to
determine precisely where those limits are to be drawn.46 Thus, the fact
that a publication threatens national security and that the national secur-
ity traditionally is a matter within the Executive's responsibility, does
not prevent the courts from protecting constitutional rights.
Not only are the President's actions in protecting the national secur-
ity subject to judicial review when they infringe on constitutional pro-
tections, but freedom of the press occupies a "preferred pos4tion"47 i
the scale of constitutional values, and a prior restraint on expression
requires an unusually heavy burden of justification. 8 Concomitantly,
there is a strong presumption against the constitutional validity of any
prior restraint on expression.
It has been recognized that the mere mention of the magic phrase
"national security" should not automatically prevent the press from
revealing the conduct of government to the public. 49 The word "secur-
ity" is a vague generality which courts have not allowed to be used as
a means of foreclosing the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.
The security of the nation is said not to lie in the defense of foreign
threats alone. Security, according to the broader meaning, also lies in
the value of our free institutions, and an obstinate and provocative press
is fundamental to the preservation of the greater values of freedom of
expression. 50 President Kennedy recognized this when he said:
Even today there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed
society by imitatmg its arbitrary restrictions. Even today, there is
little value in isuring the survival of our nation if our own tra-
ditions do not survive with it. And there is a very grave danger
that an announced need for increased security will be seized on by
those anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official
censorship and concealment 51
46. United States v. New York Times, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2163 (1971) (dissenting opinion
of Harlan, J.).
47. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 326 U.S.
516, 529-30 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942).
48. United States v. New York Times, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2141 (1971); Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 91 S. Ct. 1575, 1578 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
49. Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND.
L.J. 209, 229 (1951).
50. United States v. New York Times, 328 F Supp. 324 (SD.N.Y. 1971).
51. M. STmiN, supra note 9, at 179. See A. MErxjoHn, POLiTICAL FREmOM 112 (1960).
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SELF-RESTRAINT BY THE PRESS
The press has exercised a good deal of self-imposed censorship, not
only regarding World War II and Vietnam, 2 but also in recent "na-
tional security" crises. The New York Times knew for over a year
that the Umted States was flying high-altitude U-2 missions over the
Soviet Umon from a base in Pakistan in order to photograph military
and missile installations, but the Times did not publish this fact until one
of the planes was shot down in 1960.53 The Cuban missile crisis of 1962
was another "secret" about which the New York Times had knowledge.
On request of President Kennedy, the Times withheld news that the
Soviet Umon had atomic missiles in Cuba until an official government
announcement was made. 4 The Times in 1960 learned that an invasion
force largely financed and trained by the CIA was preparing to invade
Cuba. A decision was made by the newspaper "not to mention the
CIA's part in the invasion preparations, not to use the date of the in-
vasion, and, on April 15, not to give away in detail the fact that the
first air strike on Cuba was carried out from Guatemala." 55 The rea-
sons given for the exclusion of these facts were those of national secur-
ity, national interest and concern for the lives of the invaders.00
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy criticized the Times
for premature disclosure of security information.57 Yet Kennedy later
told the publisher of the New York Times, "I wish you had run every-
thing on Cuba. I am sorry you didn't tell it at the time." 58 Earlier
he had told the managing editor, "If you had printed more about the
operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake." 59 Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., in answering a question about a New York Times arti-
cle which quoted him as saying that he had lied to the Times in April
1961 about the landings at the Bay of Pigs, commented:
If I was reprehensible in misleading the Times by repeating
the official cover story, the Times conceivably was just as repre-
hensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the
52. See M. SrEIN, supra note 9, at 103.
53. CENSORSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 134 (G. McClellan ed. 1967).
54. Id. at 148.
55. Id. at 144.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 146.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Ted Szulc story from Miami [the story of the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion] .o
Later Schlesinger wrote, "I have wondered whether, if the press had
behaved irresponsibly, it would have spared the country a disaster." "I
The comments by Kennedy and Schlesinger clearly demonstrate
the significance of the press's obligation to inform the public of govern-
ment activities, and illustrate the deterrent effect of the availability of
such information on government conduct. The Bay of Pigs invasion,
the U-2 flights and other similar "secret" activities of the Government
which have resulted in the loss of lives and a great deal of embarrass-
ment to the United States might well have been avoided if the press
had been more diligent in keeping the public informed of the activities
of government.
CONCLUSION
On matters affecting, the national interests, the people must be pro-
vided with all the pertinent information so that they can reach intelli-
gent, responsible decisions. The first constitutional principle is that a
self-governing people must have a thorough knowledge and under--
standing of the problems of their government in order to participate
effectively in their solution. The underlying thesis of self-government
is that if a majority, of the people are well-informed, their decisions will
produce more satisfactory solutions than could be produced by a small
band of gemuses.62 In the absence of strong and effective governmental
checks and balances in the areas of national defense and international
affairs, the only effective restraint on executive power lies in a well-
informed citizenry Without an alert, free, and diligent press there
cannot be a well-informed citizenry Only if the government is vig-
orously and constantly cross-examined and exposed by the press can
the public stay informed and thereby control their government.
The difficulty arises in the twilight zone where the publication of
military secrets might immediately endanger the national security,
whereas the repression of such information would prevent the free op-
eration of the press and deceive the public. President Kennedy, in an
address before the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper
Publisher's Association, asked the members of the newspaper profession
60. Id. at 142.
61. Id. at 146.
62. Umted States v. Associated Press, 52 F Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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"to re-examine their own responsibilities." 63 The Cold War, according
to Kennedy, requires newspapermen to exercise the same restraint they
would in actual war. He continued, "Every newspaper now asks itself
with respect to every story, 'Is it news?' All I suggest is that you add
the question: 'Is it in the interest of national security' "
No formula can be entirely satisfactory The primary responsibility
for safeguarding the national security still rests with the President, but
the prohibition of prior restraints is so fundamental to the first amend-
ment that only in the most exceptional of circumstances should they be
permitted. The Near case speaks of "actual obstruction" to the Govern-
ments "recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of
transports or the number and location of troops." '5 This list was ob-
viously not all-inclusive but was intended to embrace only the most
serious and immediate threats to the Government's ability to wage war,
imminent death to military personnel, or serious breaches of national
security A publication that will merely demonstrate an embarrassing
disparity between the public and private words and acts of elected
officials falls far short of the seriousness required for a prior restraint.
Professor Chafee sums up the problem of defining the boundary line of
first amendment freedoms m the following manner:
We cannot define the right of free speech with the precision of
the Rule against Perpetuities or the Rule in Shelley's Case, because
it involves national policies which are more flexible than private
property, but we can establish a working principle of classifica-
tion in this method of balancing and this broad test of certain
danger.06 [Emphasis supplied]
In light of the deep roots of the prohibition of prior restraints in both
the Constitution and the common law, exceptions should be made only
in the most extraordinary of circumstances. As Mr. Justice Brennan
has stated:
[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to rmperiling the safety of a transport already at
63. CaNsoRsErP iN THE UNiTED STATES, supra note 53, at 145.
64. Id.
65. 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931).
66. Z. Chafee, supra note 18, at 35.
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sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order.67
[Emphasis supplied]
The Supreme Court's denial of an injunction to the Government
in the Times and Washington Post cases was a soundly based decision
strongly supported by the central thrust of the first amendment. A prior
restraint on the press for reasons of national security should be allowed
only where the publication would create immediate, inevitable, direct,
and irreparable harm to the Umted States. The burden of proof on
the Government in such situations is extremely difficult to overcome,
but the first amendment demands nothing less.
ROBERT F FLINN
67. Umted States v. New York Times, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2148 (1971).
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